MNC-Host Government Relationship: Research Review, Gaps and Future Directions

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to provide a literature review of the MNC subsidiary-host government relationship, which is an emerging topic in the field of international business. We conducted a systematic review of 16 articles published in the leading business management journals, and came up with the following suggestions for future studies: a) to integrate a behavioral perspective to an existing economic perspective; b) to include other non-business actors such as NGOs (non-governmental organizations) to develop a network-based framework, c) highlight the dual tension faced by subsidiaries in managing relations with the headquarters and government at the same time, d) conduct more qualitative studies to get a deeper and rich understanding of this phenomena and e) conduct more studies that use subsidiary as the unit of analysis, while also increasing research on emerging markets.

INTRODUCTION

Interaction between multinational corporations (MNCs) and host-government has been acknowledged as an important issue in the international business arena. However, the structure and nature of such relationship is still a complex theme and it is a topic that attracts attention from both academics and practitioners. Nurturing relationship with government has been recognized as being an important determinant of firm's performance (Weidenbaum, 1980). Prior research also suggest that government can be a source of competitive advantage mainly if firms have the ability to interact with government bodies and representatives in a way that creates a favorable environment to them (Blumentritt, 2003).

Research on MNC-host government relationship dates back to the 1980s but has up till now produced a lot of varied research from a theoretical and methodological perspective. The objective of the paper is to perform a review of the MNC (or MNC subsidiary)-host government relationship. We feel that it is critical to conduct such a study to provide a guideline for scholars to produce relevant and interesting research in the area, this we highlight in terms of the theoretical and methodological perspectives currently prevalent in the given topic area.

The review indicates that scholars need to move beyond the sole focus on economic theoretical perspectives, and incorporate sociological and strategic viewpoints (e.g. Luo 2001; 2004). In addition, the internal MNC dimension to political strategy formulation has been largely ignored. Hence, there needs to be research on the tension between corporate headquarter and its subsidiaries in the political strategy formulation process in relation to the requirements of the market in which the different units operates. Furthermore, differences in the context requires the MNCs to have different political strategies at the subsidiary level, so coherent and comprehensive models for political strategy formulation at the subsidiary level need to be developed. Lastly, there seems to be a focus on quantitative research, with qualitative and conceptual papers being

under represented which is impacting the in-depth understanding of the topic. Quantitative studies also need to focus on larger data sets which are not based in a single country or are different subsidiaries of the same MNC.

The layout of the paper is as follows: the following section presents a discussion on the selection process of the 16 articles chosen from 8 different journals. We then present a discussion of the work done in the field and identify possible gaps. Based on it, we propose guidelines for future research to suggest avenues for research development in the topic area. Finally, we conclude with a discussion on the contribution and limitations of the paper as a whole.

IDENTIFICATION OF RELEVANT ARTICLES

We decided to solely focus on journal articles for reviewing the relevant literature to the topic, thus excluding books and conference papers. Our starting point then was to select journals for the review process but it did not seem plausible due to the paucity of research on the topic (Blumentritt & Rehbein, 2008). Instead, we decided to limit our search to two online databases: ScienceDirect and ISI web of science. To identify the articles, we performed a keyword search in these online databases. The keywords used were “subsidiary” (also “subunit), “politics” (also “political”) and “host government”. Title and abstract of all the journal articles that appeared through this search process were used to evaluate their relevance to the study. This resulted in a list of 19 articles, but as this is a research paper we have decided to exclude 3 articles published in management journals such as the California Management Review, Harvard Business Review and Long Range Planning because these journals are more practice oriented. Overall, the final list of journal articles which we read for this paper consisted of 16 articles published in 8 different journals as displayed in Table 1.

Table 1 [about here]

ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE

We classified the literature on the relationship between MNCs and host-government in three main themes: I) *Theoretical perspectives called as bargaining power perspective running out of steam*, II) *Political Activity of MNCs* and III) *Methods* summarized in the Appendix 2 (see Table 2). We believe that by identifying our literature review in these themes would allow us not only to present what have been studied at the present but also to provide a direct outline of possible gaps as well as our recommendation for future research directions which constitutes the main target of the paper. Hence, in the next section we address the main issue of each research topic and then we go a step further by commenting the needs for research directions.

Bargaining power perspective, is it running out of steam?

Bargaining power perspective has been mainly used in empirical studies analyzing the resolution of conflict between MNC-host government relationships (Potyner 1982; Fagre & Wells 1982). Before looking into the main research streams on power, it is relevant to understand the concept of power itself. Blalock (1989) defines power as being an ability to influence or constrain one actor over another.

The bargaining power states that access to critical and unique resources (in relation to competition in the market) can allow the firm a better bargaining position in relation to the host government, hence negotiating favorably. Most of the research grounded in this framework tends to observe the outcome of the subsidiary ownership level and the extent of the host government interference in a MNCs operation (Poynter, 1982). The basic logic is based on the assumption that MNCs with *greater bargaining power* are likely to get a better negotiation with host government and *are less likely* to face government intervention. This is well explained in Fagre and Wells (1982) analysis of host-government-MNC relationship particularly from American

multinationals in Latin America countries. The authors found that quantity and nature of resources (in relations to its competitors) of the subsidiary has an influence on its relationship with the host government which is in line with the bargaining power perspective. For them, the model is good to predict negotiations between the two units.

The bargaining power model predicts that the source of power can be found in both host-government and MNCs. Corporates attributes such as size, level of diversification, technological spillover and MNC experience captured by the years of its operation in a country are the main determinants of power of MNCs (Poynter, 1982) while host country attractiveness in terms of business opportunities as well as economic freedom and credibility may determine the balance of power between MNCs and host-government relationship (Moon & Lado, 2000). Prior literature has linked the bargaining power of an MNC to various factors in the firm-, industry-, and country-level of analysis (Moon & Lado, 2000).

In line with the corporate attribute, Potyner (1982) examining the reasons why subsidiaries in the same country face variation in the level of political interference founded evidence that host government discriminates among foreign companies when deciding to intervene. The results shown that the subsidiaries can manage the political intervention (e.g. having the majority of host country nationals in subsidiary top management tends to reduce the degree of intervention).

Taking into account the source of power from the perspective of the MNCS, the framework suggests that the probability for intervention of the host government is lower when foreign firms have high levels of technology and export most of their production in the host country. Despite some evidences, the argument is poorly supported in Negandhi (1980). When analyzing the causes of conflicts in American, European and Japanese MNCs in several countries, the author found that the nature and intensity of conflict was associated with the mismatch of expectation between MNCs and host government as well as the market condition rather than corporate

attributes.

A literature review provided by Moon & Lado (2000) found that the model has been inconsistent, with poor managerial implication and lack of link with performance. The authors propose an extended bargaining power model with a resource-based view. They believe that in order to link power with performance a resource based view should be incorporated into it.

The model has also been criticized by Blumentritt (2003) who argue that solely access to resources cannot allow the firm a better negotiating position with the government. Based on such observation, we advise the following:

> *Recommendation #1: Future studies should contribute theoretically to the bargaining power model by moving from merely using economic based theories such as transaction cost to integrate a behavioral perspective in order to gain a better understanding of the complex phenomena at hand.*

Luo (2001; 2004) suggests moving away from viewing MNC subsidiary-host government relationship as being solely a competition. He advocates that a collaborative relationship also exists between the two entities due to the presence of complementary resources implying the existence of a certain degree of interdependency between them. In addition, the goals and interests of the two entities are not completely divergent as put forth by the bargaining power perspective. Instead, they can find common interests and goals, which can allow them to work together. Broadly, this requires the scholars to have alternative theoretical lens, i.e. strategic and sociological theories (e.g. social exchange theory), which is contrary to the dominant economic perspective used by scholars in the field.

On the whole, Luo (2004) argues that a coopetitive relationship exists between the MNC and

host government, which means that the both entities co-operate in certain aspects while there is also competition in the other aspects. Luo (2001; 2004) also emphasizes on the positive effects of cooperative MNE–host government relationships, arguing that strong cooperative relationships can generate sustained relational rents to both parties. The author highlights the importance of nurturing a good relationship with political actors that can be at different levels of government. Even though, according to Sun et al., (2010) building strong ties to highly stable political regimes such as in China does not necessarily enhance performance. They stress the risk of firms to be highly embedded in the network. A situation called by Uzzi (1997) as '*paradox of embeddedness*', in which strong ties may lock firms into network that might not be suited to them mainly when the business and the political environment change. The reason for caution is linked to the idea that the value of political networks changes over time. Nevertheless, the authors still believe that firm's should have an integrated strategy that accommodate both market and nonmarket actors. Based on such observation, we suggest the following:

> *Recommendation #2: Most of the studies using the bargaining power framework consider the dyadic relationship between host-government and MNCs. In today's business environment other forces also influence corporate behavior such as NGOs (non-governmental organizations). Most of the studies have not yet included a third actor in the model. The reason to include NGOs could be the case of increasing legitimacy for MNCs towards government. Future studies should be aware of the existence of different bases of power, which may vary across actors. Future research should include the development of a more network-based framework within the bargaining power perspective.*

<u>Political Activity of MNCs</u>

Political activity can be understood as corporate effort to shape government policy in ways that meet firms' interests (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Multinational corporations might not have uniform political strategies in the different subsidiaries in which they operate. This can be mainly due to the differences in the nature of the countries. Broadly emerging and advanced economies pose different challenges for the subsidiaries in terms of devising the political strategy. Puck et al., (2013) state that the corporate political activity model proposed by Hillman & Hitt (1999), whom proposes that political strategy occurs in respect to 1) information, 2) financial and 3) electorate, is not completely applicable to the context of the emerging economies. Increased exposure in these contexts can lead to adverse consequences for the firms employing the strategies proposed in the model. For example, increased disclosure of information by subsidiaries in emerging markets can be perceived as greenwashing, hence can damage the company reputation and image.

The crucial point is that, Hillman & Hitt (1999) model was developed based on data from advanced economies, so extant research has shown that it may not be completely applicable to all different settings. In addition, MNC subsidiaries need to employ different political strategies due to a combination of subsidiary level (size, years of operations in the host country), corporate level (degree of international diversification, decision making structure) and host country level factors (degree of cultural openness to foreign subsidiary, degree of bureaucracy efficiency and competition laws). This points the need to conduct further research on developing coherent and comprehensive models for political strategies to be employed at the subsidiary level to manage their political relations with the host government.

Blumentritt & Nigh (2002) using data from 22 American MNCs operating in 37 countries suggest that political activity formulation occurs not only within the countries in which MNCs operate but also between different subsidiaries within the same MNC as well. Inter-subsidiary co-

operation shows the extent to which the subsidiaries are autonomous in political strategy formulation, but this does question the extent to which the headquarter allows the subsidiaries to be autonomous and to what extent headquarter would aspire to have greater homogeneity in the political strategy adopted by the different subsidiaries in order to protect the overall corporate image. For instance, the reputation of Telia was severely impacted by the stories of corrupt practices in Uzbekistan, so can the corporate headquarter allow complete autonomy to subsidiaries in formulating political strategy making or does it need to have complete control over it.

In general, corporate headquarter wants to have a homogenous political strategy across all its subsidiaries, but at the same time subsidiaries feel the pressure to conform to the political environment in which they are located. This dual tension creates problems for the top management of the subsidiaries while preparing the strategy (Wan & Hillman 2005). Although, research has been done on how subsidiaries manage their political relationship with the host government, negligible research has been done on the internal tension between the corporate headquarter and subsidiary in the political strategy formulation. In the overall, we recommend the following:

> *Recommendation #3: Future research needs to be done on developing models which explain how MNC subsidiaries can develop their political strategies based on the different internal corporate and external environmental factors. In addition, there needs to be research done on the internal tension between the corporate headquarter and subsidiaries while formulating the political strategy. Perhaps attention should be given to the understanding of how can subsidiaries respond to pressures from host market and the corporate headquarter while making the strategy especially in terms of their relative*

importance and impact. An interesting example is the state owned multinationals, which have been shown to internationalize for political motivations. Not much research has been done on the post-entry political strategy formulation at the subsidiary level. It will be interesting to examine how the dual tension impacts the subsidiary political strategy formulation in case the subsidiary management feels that being apolitical from one hand will help their business operations while the headquarter wants them pursue relations with the political actors on the other hand. Additionally, we also advise scholars to consider if formal government affair structure, that is, a dedicated unit or position responsible to develop relationship with different spheres of the government body tends to improve companies' ability of managing social and political issues.

Methods used and levels of analysis

The papers analyzed show several types of methodologies: qualitative, literature review, conceptual paper and quantitative papers (see Appendix 3, table 3). By far the majority of papers in our review are empirical. The literature on MNC-host government relationship has extensively applied quantitative methods (n=12) with the use of surveys and regression analysis. From the sample of 16 articles, 75% were quantitative while qualitative papers, literature review and conceptual paper represent only 6.25% respectively. The qualitative papers opted for the use of case studies (Osland & Bjorkman, 1998 and Sun et al, 2010) but both focus on a single country, China.

We argue that the literature is in disadvantage by using more extensively quantitative methods than qualitative. It is clear that there is a lack of balance of methodologies employed. The adoption of more qualitative analysis would allow a deeper examination and greater understanding of the relationship between MNCs and host-government. We believe that if

researchers engage in more qualitative methods the literature could be enriched with particularized interpretations as well as it would add knowledge in regards to the context of each country where the MNC is operating. By having information about MNC strategic behavior to respond to government forces specifically in terms of common practices, events and process would shed new light on corporate political behavior. In sum, we consider the following:

> *Recommendation # 4: It appears that the literature did not achieve yet a well-balanced methodological approach with a greater use of quantitative method over qualitative methods. Such imbalance might limit further understanding of the relationship between MNC and host-government. Increasing the number of article using qualitative methodology would enrich our comprehension on such important issue, mainly because nowadays firms cannot exclusively depend on their competitiveness and efficiency but also on its ability to nurture relationships with a range group of actors (e.g. political actors). In this regard, a qualitative approach would be interesting to provide more insights about such relevant phenomena as well as more detailed description of it, which would allow not only statistical generalization as commonly used in the literature but also analytical one.*

From our sample of two qualitative papers, both used case study focusing on the Chinese context (Sun et al., 2010 and Osland & Bjorkman, 1998). We recommend that more studies in the future are conducted by looking at different markets instead. With respect to the quantitative studies, the majority of the papers have focused on a single country (or two countries, mainly China and United States) or the subsidiaries of a single/few MNCs. There is a need to conduct studies that include diversified geographic contexts. Furthermore, account for variations across multinational corporations in order to better understand the internal dimension of political

strategy formulation. Most of the articles in our review have treated the multinational corporation as the unit of analysis. This has been the main reason for the lack of research published on examining the internal tension between the headquarters and its subsidiaries. Based on that, we suggest the following:

> *Recommendation # 5: The subsidiary should be the unit of analysis in future studies, in addition also study this process at the individual level (at the top management of the subsidiary). Furthermore, both quantitative and qualitative should incorporate diversity by examining varied geographic contexts and study subsidiaries from multiple MNCs.*

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND CONTRIBUTION

The main contribution of the paper was to perform a review of the MNC-host government relationship literature in the post-market entry phase. Research in this topic area has a long history dating back to the 1980s but it needed a review which identifies avenues for future investigation which adds novelty and richness to the understanding of the topic. The key suggestions from the paper are: 1) incorporate sociological viewpoints to the traditional economic perspective prevalent in the topic area, 2) examine the tension between the subsidiaries and headquarter in the political strategy formulation, 3) develop coherent and comprehensive model(s) for developing political strategy at the subsidiary level and 4) focus more on qualitative studies and allow for diversity in geographic context in the empirical papers.

The main limitation of the paper is in the selection of the articles as we selected only 16 articles, so there is a possibility that we have missed out on some important papers published in the topic area. We will try to expand this list for a journal (or conference paper) publication by using other keyword options, especially words that can be used interchangeably with those

presently used. In addition, the reference lists of the selected journal articles (especially the latest ones) will be used to make sure that our search is as exhaustive as possible. Moreover, there was no time frame selected for choosing the articles.

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Appendix 1:

Table 1 shows the list of journals and number of articles within the theme.

Table 1: List of journals and number of articles

Journal	Number of Articles
Journal of International Business Studies	7
Business and Society	3
Management International Review	1
Journal of International Management	1
International Business Review	1
Journal of Management	1
Human Relations	1
European Management Journal	1
Total	**16**

Appendix 2:

Table 2 displays the summary of the papers identified for this literature review by including the aims, methods used, method employed as well as the research findings.

Table 2. Summary of the Literature Review

Author (Year)	Aim	Theory/ Main Literature	Method	Findings
Negandhi, A. R. (1980)	To explore the conflicting issues and causes of conflicts between the MNCs and host government in the host countries.	Open-system perspective (used in organization theory) by focusing on the impact of internal attributes of an organization on its external environment.	Structured-interviews with senior executives in the 124 MNCs (102 cases of conflicts) with American, European and Japanese ownership operating in Brazil, India, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore and Thailand.	The nature and intensity of conflict was associated with the mismatch of expectation between MNCs and host government as well as the market condition than other attributes such as size, level of technology employed, level of diversification and period of operation in the host country.
Moon, C. W. & Augustine, A. Lado (2000)	To provide a critical review of the literature on MNC-Host government bargaining power relationship and propose an integrative theoretical model within resource-based view of the firm.	Bargaining power grounded in the resource-based view	It is a literature review on MNC-Host government bargaining power relationship.	The review on MNC-host government bargaining power revealed that: the empirical findings are inconsistent, sometimes incomparable and with poor managerial implication. It is clear a lack of broader theoretical framework and a lack of link between bargaining power and performance. The RBV is founded to be a model that can provide a connection between performance and bargaining power.
Van, W & Hillman, A. J. (2006)	To understand why MNE subsidiary adopt different political strategies to other subsidiaries from the same MNE.	International business and corporate political strategy literature based on MNE parent-subsidiary perspective.	Combination of survey and archival data on US MNE's subsidiaries in Western European Countries.	The results demonstrated that dissimilar strategy is attributed to a combination of subsidiary (size and years of operations in the host country), corporate (degree of international diversification and decision making structure) and host country (degree of cultural openness to foreign subsidiary, degree of bureaucracy efficiency and competition laws) factors.
Blumentritt, T. P & Nigh, D. (2002)	To understand how MNCs formulate and implement political strategies with affiliated units.	International corporate political activities and international business literature with resource dependence theory as foundation.	Hypothesis test with main variables derived from bargaining power theory such as: host country attractiveness measured by GDP growth as well its degree of economic freedom.	The more integrated a subsidiary is with its affiliate in a strategic sense, the greater its integration with other subsidiaries in a political sense. Thus, political activity occur not only within the countries in which MNCs operate and have subsidiary but between those subsidiary as well (inter-subsidiary)

Blementritt, and Rehbein T.(2008)	To understand what factors are contributing to a foreign subsidiary political activity by taken into account the political capital concept	Bargaining power framework and resource dependence theory.	Quantitative paper based on questionnaire sent to top managers of US subsidiary from the pharmaceutical and chemical industries.	The variation of political activities across foreign subsidiaries depends on ownership of bargaining power (organization size, technological intensity, economic spillover and export intensity- the study support the framework) and government affair of activities. For the author units dedicated formally to government activities tend to improve ability to manage political and social issues.
Hillman, J. Amy (2003)	To understand how political strategies are chosen by MNEs.	Institutional theory and RBV	Survey methodologies. Respondents were either the senior public affairs/govern. Relations and top subsidiary managers. Survey was sent to 150 US MNCs.	The study confirms that institutional context matter when formulating political strategy. Firms appear both to make political strategy choices based on internal (firm) characteristics and external political characteristic. Firms using a relational approach are also likely to use constituency building but less to use the information
Casseres (1980)	To integrate transaction cost and bargaining power approaches into one framework when explaining firms ownership preferences (wholly or joint venture) for subsidiaries.	Bargaining power and transaction cost.	Quantitative paper (It uses statistical method to separate the effects of the two approaches empirically - Binomial logit model). Data from 187 parent US subsidiaries firms	Theory about MNEs should not consider not only costs and benefits perceived by firms when deciding structure of ownership in subsidiaries (wholly or joint venture), but also the impact of relations between firms and government. Therefore, the integrated approach can help to get a better understand of firms global strategy. I.e., what firms can get and what they want.
Sun et al (2010)	To study, at the inter-organizational level, the nature and the value in terms of performance when firms are embeddedned in the host-country political network.	Political embeddedness	Longitudinal study involving three case studies of major automobile players in its China subsidiary (from 1980 to 2000).	Building strong ties to highly stable political regimes such as in China does not necessarily enhance performance. The authors highlighted that firm´s should have an integrated strategy that includes both market and nonmarket actors.
Osland and Bjorkman (1998)	How does government pressure influence MNC strategies?	bargaining power perspective	semi-structured interviews, 24 respondents, Chinese subsidiary of Finnish and American firms	Chinese government has increase pressure on MNCs to produce locally and lobby their respective governments for Chinese interests
Puck, Rogers and Mohr (2013)	Examine impact of subsidiary political strategies in emerging markets, using visibility as the moderating influence	corporate political activity (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), firm visibility (IPO literature)	173 subsidiaries in 6 emerging economies, survey questionnaire, hierarchical moderated multiple regression	Hillman and Hitt (1999) model is only partially applicable to emerging economies context, firm visibility requires additional corporate political activity but it can also increase risk exposure if not properly implemented (e.g. green washing)

Hillman and Wan (2005)	Examine the determinants of MNE subsidiary political strategy given that its faces dual pressures of isomorphism from a) host government and b) MNC headquarter (or management)?	corporate political activity (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), institutional theory	169 subsidiaries in EU of American multinationals, survey questionnaire, hierarchical linear modeling	Find support for external and internal pressures for isomorphism in political strategy formulation at subsidiary level. It is not possible to determine the nature of their relative impact.
Luo (2004)	Examine why and how coopetition takes place, also explain how it is different from competition and collaboration in MNC-host government relations	Resource dependency theory, network theory	Conceptual Paper	Identifies a conceptual framework for coopetition and political responses (2x2 matrix based on varying levels of competition and collaboration). The political responses are adopted by the MNCs based on their perception of their political environment
Luo (2001)	The paper studies cooperative relations between the MNC and host government	Strategic (resource sharing), sociological theories (social exchange)	131 respondents (senior managers of Chinese subsidiaries), survey questionnaire, multiple regression	Overall, the paper puts forth the idea of collaborative relationship between host government and MNC, which is based on resource complimentarily, personal relations, political accommodation and organizational credibility.
Potyner (1982)	Why do subsidiaries in the same country face variation in the level of political interference	bargaining power perspective	104 subsidiaries in 4 developing countries, face to face survey questionnaires	Host government discriminates among foreign companies when deciding to intervene. Acc. to the bargaining power model, the subsidiaries can manage the political intervention based on their individual corporate attributes e.g. majority of host country nationals in subsidiary top management reduces intervention.
Fagre and Wells (1982)	Can the host government-MNC relationship be explained in terms of bargaining power?	Bargaining Power Perspective	Latin American subsidiaries of American multinationals, quantitative data collection and analysis	Does support the argument that quantity and nature of resources (in relations to its competitors) of the subsidiary has an influence on its relationship with the host government. Hence, the study shows that bargaining power perspective can be useful for examining the negotiations between MNC and host government
Blumentritt (2003)	Examine the variation in the political activities of different subsidiaries within a MNC	Resource dependency theory, government affair strategy (Meznar and Nigh 1995)	91 subsidiaries for 22 US MNCs, survey questionnaires, regression analysis	The study found that subsidiary political activities are heavily influenced by the political orientation of their top managers. In addition it found that these managerial variables have a greater impact on intra-MNC political activity differences than bargaining power related resources.

Appendix 3: Table 3 presents the methods used in the 16 papers analyzed to perform this literature review. As one can see the quantitative papers represents the method most commonly employed with 75% of the papers (n=1) while qualitative papers, literature review and conceptual paper represent only 6.25% respectively.

Table 3: Methods employed by paper

	Methodology			
Research	**Quantitative**	**Qualitative**	**Literature Review**	**Conceptual Paper**
Negandhi, A. R. (1980)	X			
Moon, C. W. and A. A. Lado (2000)			X	
Blementritt & Rehbein (2008)	X			
Casseres (1980)	X			
Osland & Bjorkman (1998)		X		
Poynter (1982)	X			
Fagre and Wells (1982)	X			
Van, W & Hillman, A. J. (2006)	X			
Blumentritt, T. P and Nigh, D. (2002)	X			
Hillman, J. Amy (2003)	X			
Puck at all., (2013)	X			
Hillman and Wan (2005)	X			
Blumentritt (2003)	X			
Luo (2001)	X			
Luo (2004)				X
Sun et al (2010)		X		
TOTAL	**12**	**2**	**1**	**1**